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Abstract
Within the realm of dynamic of smart buildings and smart cities, dynamic re-
sponse management is playing an ever-increasing role thus attracting the attention
of scientists from different disciplines. Dynamic demand response management in-
volves a set of operations aiming at decentralizing the control of loads in large and
complex power networks. Each single appliance if fully responsive and readjusts
its energy demand to the overall network load. A main issue is related to mains
frequency oscillations resulting from an unbalance between supply and demand. In
a nutshell, this paper contributes to the topic by equipping each signal consumer
with strategic insight. In particular, we highlight three main contributions and a
few other minor contributions. First, we design a mean-field game for the TCLs
application, study the mean-field equilibrium for the deterministic mean-field game
and investigate on asymptotic stability for the microscopic dynamics. Second, we
extend the analysis and design to imperfect models which involve both stochastic
or deterministic disturbances. This leads to robust mean-field equilibrium strategies
guaranteeing stochastic and worst-case stability, respectively. Minor contributions
involve the use of stochastic control strategies rather than deterministic, and some
numerical studies illustrating the efficacy of the proposed strategies.
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1 Introduction
Demand response management involves a set of operations aiming at decentralizing load
control in power networks [3, 13, 14, 31]. In particular, it calls for the alteration of
the timing, of the level of instantaneous demand, or of the total electricity by end-use
customers from their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price
of electricity over time. This is possible also through an opportune design of incentive
payments to induce lower electricity use at off-peak times.
A communication protocol aggregates relevant information on the past, current and
forecasted demand and transmits it to each fully responsive load controller or decision
mechanism, which will adopt opportune actions such as increasing or decreasing the proper
load or energy demand. The novelty of this paper is in that fully responsive load control
together with the many cooperative and competitive aspects involved in the process, are
now reviewed as a game with a large number of indistinguishable players, these being
the single loads. For illustrative purposes, in this paper, fully responsive load control is
reviewed in the context of thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs), in smart buildings
or plug-in electric vehicles [4, 22, 23, 25, 29], see Fig. 1.
Figure 1: Demand response involves populations of electrical loads (lower block) and
energy generators (upper block) intertwined in a feedback-loop scheme.
A first idea of this work, which is common also to [4, 6], is to adopt stochastic response
strategies rather than deterministic. This means that each TCL selects a probability with
which to activate one of the two functioning modes, on and off. Thus a probability value of
1/2means that the TCL is 50% on and 50% off. It has been shown in [4, 6] that stochastic
response strategies outperform deterministic ones, especially in terms of attenuating the
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mains frequency oscillations. These are due to the unbalance between energy demand
and supply (see e.g. [26]). The mains frequency usually needs to be stabilized around a
nominal value (50 Hz in Europe). If electrical demand exceeds generation then frequency
will decline, and vice versa.
A qualitative plot of such an oscillatory phenomenon is displayed in Fig. 2. The two
rows depict the time plot of the state of each TCL, namely the temperature in the top row
and the mode of functioning in the bottom row. Here each TCL increases or decreases
its proper load in response to the current network load, and as clear visually, this induces
oscillations in the mains frequency due to an undesired synchronized reaction of the whole
population of TCLs.
This preamble introduces the main aim of this paper, which studies constructive design
methods of distributed demand response management strategies in order to reduce the
mains frequency oscillations and stabilize both the temperature and the functioning mode
of the TCLs.
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Figure 2: Example of oscillations: qualitative time plot of the state of each TCL, namely
temperature (top row) and mode of functioning (bottom row).
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The model used in this paper is as follows. Each single TCL is a player and is char-
acterized by two state variables, the temperature and the functioning mode. The state
dynamics of a TCL — henceforth referred to as microscopic dynamics to distinguish
it from the dynamics of the aggregate temperature and functioning mode of the whole
population, the latter called macroscopic dynamics — describes the time evolution of its
temperature and mode in the form of a linear ordinary differential equation in the deter-
ministic case, and of a stochastic differential equation in the stochastic case. In addition
to the state dynamics, each TCL is programmed with a given finite-horizon cost func-
tional that accounts for i) energy consumption, ii) deviation of mains frequency from the
nominal one, and iii) deviation of the TCL’s temperature from a reference value. More
formally, the mains frequency involved in the specifics ii) is used in a cross-coupling mean-
field term that incentivizes the TCL to switch to off if the mains frequency is below the
nominal value and to switch to on if the mains frequency is above the nominal value. In
other words, the cross-coupling mean-field term models all kinds of incentive payments,
benefits, or smart pricing policies aiming at shifting demand from high-peak to off-peak
periods.
1.1 Highlights of contributions
This paper provides three main results. First, in the spirit of prescriptive game theory and
mechanism design [5] we design a mean-field game for the TCLs application, study the
mean-field equilibrium for the deterministic mean-field game and investigate on asymp-
totic stability for the microscopic dynamics. Asymptotic stability means that both the
temperature and the mode functioning of each TCL converges to the reference value. A
second result relates to the stochastic case, characterized by a stochastic disturbance in
the form of a Brownian motion in the microscopic dynamics. After establishing a mean-
field equilibrium, we provide some results on stochastic stability. In particular, we focus
on two distinct scenarios. In one case, we assume that the stochastic disturbance expires
in a neighborhood of the origin. This reflects in having the Brownian motion coefficients
linear in the state. The resulting dynamics is well-known in the literature as geometric
Brownian motion. As for any geometric Brownian motion, we can study conditions for it
to be stochastically stable almost surely. This means that the state trajectories converge
to zero with probability one. In a second case, the stochastic disturbance is independent
on the state and the Brownian motion coefficients are constant. This leads to a dynamics
which resembles the Langevin equation. Following well-known results on the Langevin
equation, the dynamics is proven to be stochastically stable in the second-moment. An
expository work on stochastic analysis and stability is [21]. A third result deals with ro-
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bustness for the microscopic dynamics. The dynamics is now influenced by an additional
adversarial disturbance, with bounded resource or energy. Even for this case, we study the
mean-field equilibrium and investigate on conditions that guarantee worst-case stability.
1.2 Literature overview
We introduce next two streams of literature. One is related to dynamic response manage-
ment, while the second one is about the theory of differential games with a large number
of indistinguishable players, also known as mean-field games.
1.2.1 Related literature on demand response
Examples of papers developing the idea of dynamic demand management are [11, 12,
22, 23]. In particular, [11] provides an overview on the redistribution of the load away
from peak hours and the design of decentralized strategies to produce a predefined load
trajectory. This idea is further developed in [12]. To understand the role of game theory
in respect to this specific context the reader is referred to [22]. There, the authors present
a large population game where the agents are plug-in electric vehicles and the Nash-
equilibrium strategies (see [8]) correspond to distributed charging policies that redistribute
the load away from peaks. The resulting strategies are known with the name of valley-
filling strategies. In this paper we adopt the same perspective in that we show that
network frequency stabilization can be achieved by giving incentives to the agents to
adjust their strategies in order to converge to a mean field equilibrium. To do this, in the
spirit of prescriptive game theory [5], a central planner or game designer has to design the
individual objective function so to penalize those agents that are in on state in peak hours,
as well as those who are in off state in off-peak hours. Valley-filling and coordination
strategies have been shown particularly efficient in thermostatically controlled loads such
as refrigerators, air conditioners and electric water heaters [23].
The results obtained in this paper are in accordance with the recent results in [4],
according to which, stochastic control laws are in general more appropriate than deter-
ministic ones when it comes to desynchronize the appliances functioning.
1.2.2 Related literature on mean-field games
A second stream of literature related to the problem at hand is on mean-field games.
Mean-field games were formulated by Lasry and Lions in [20] and independently by M.Y.
Huang, P. E. Caines and R. Malhamé in [18, 19]. The mean-field theory of dynamical
games is a modeling framework at the interface of differential game theory, mathematical
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physics, and H∞-optimal control that tries to capture the mutual influence between a
crowd and its individuals.
From a mathematical point of view the mean-field approach leads to a system of two
PDEs. The first PDE is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. The second
PDE is the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation which describes the density of
the players. Explicit solutions in terms of mean-field equilibria are available for linear-
quadratic mean-field games [7], and have been recently extended to more general cases
in [15]. In addition to explicit solutions, a variety of solution schemes have been recently
proposed based on discretization and/or numerical approximations, see e.g. [1, 2, 24].
The idea of extending the state space, which originates in optimal control [27, 28], has
been also used to approximate mean-field equilibria in [9]. More recently, robustness and
risk-sensitivity have been brought into the picture of mean-field games [10, 30], where the
first PDE is now the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation. For a survey on mean-field
games and applications we refers the reader to [16]. A first attempt to apply mean-field
games to demand management is in [6].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we state the problem and introduce
the model. In Section 3 we review some preliminary results. In Section 4 we state and
discuss the main results. In Section 6 we provide some discussion. In Section 5 we carry
out some numerical studies. Finally, in Section 7 we provide some conclusions.
1.3 Notation
The symbol E indicates the expectation operator. We use ∂x and ∂
2
xx to denote the first
and second partial derivatives with respect to x, respectively. Given a vector x ∈ Rn
and a matrix a ∈ Rn×n we denote by ‖x‖2a the weighted two-norm x
Tax. The symbol ai•
means the ith row of a given matrix a. We denote by Diag(x) the diagonal matrix in Rn×n
whose entries in the main diagonal are the components of x. We denote by dist(X,X∗)
the distance between two points X and X∗ in Rn. We denote by ΠM(X) the projection
of X onto set M. The symbol “:” denotes the Frobenius product.
2 Population of TCLs through mean-field games
In this section, in the spirit of prescriptive game theory and mechanism design [5], we
design a mean-field game for the TCLs application, with the aim of incentivizing cooper-
ation among the TCLs through an opportune design of distributed cost functionals, one
per each TCL.
Consider a population of hybrid controlled thermostat loads (TCLs) and a time horizon
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window [0, T ]. Each TCL is characterized by a continuous state, namely the temperature
x(t), and a binary state πon(t) ∈ {0, 1}, representing the condition on or off at time
t ∈ [0, T ]. When the TCL is set to on the temperature decreases exponentially up to
a fixed lower temperature xon whereas in the off position the temperature increases
exponentially up to a higher temperature xoff . Then, the temperature of each appliance
evolves according to the following differential equations:
x˙(t) =
{
−α(x(t)− xon) if πon(t) = 1
−β(x(t)− xoff ) if πon(t) = 0
, t ∈ [0, T ), (1)
with initial state x(0) = x and where the rates α, β are given positive scalars.
In accordance with [4, 6] we set the problem in a stochastic framework where each TCL
is in one of the two states on or off with given probabilities πon ∈ [0, 1] and πoff ∈ [0, 1].
The control variable is the transitioning rate uon from off to on and the transitioning
rate uoff from on to off . This is illustrated in the automata in Fig. 3.
πon πoff
uon
uoff 1− uon
1− uoff
Figure 3: Automata describing transition rates from on to off and viceversa.
The corresponding dynamics is then given by


π˙on(t) = uon(t)− uoff(t), t ∈ [0, T ),
π˙off (t) = uoff(t)− uon(t), t ∈ [0, T ),
0 ≤ πon(t), πoff (t) ≤ 1, t ∈ [0, T ).
(2)
As π˙on(t) + π˙off (t) = 0, we can simply consider only one of the above dynamics.
Then, let us denote y(t) = πon(t) and introduce a stochastic disturbance in the form of
a Brownian motion, denote it B(t), and a deterministic disturbance w(t) = [w1(t) w2]
T .
For any x, y in the
“set of feasible states” S :=]xon, xoff [×]0, 1[,
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the resulting dynamics in a very general form is given by


dx(t) =
(
y(t)
[
− α(x(t)− xon)
]
+ (1− y(t))
[
− β(x(t)− xoff )
]
+d11w1(t) + d12w2(t)
)
dt+ σ11(x)dB(t),
=:
(
f(x(t), y(t)) + d11w1(t) + d12w2(t)
)
dt+ σ11(x)dB(t), t ∈ [0, T ),
x(0) = x,
dy(t) =
(
uon(t)− uoff(t) + d21w1(t) + d22w2(t)
)
dt+ σ22(y)dB(t)
=:
(
g(u(t)) + d21w1(t) + d22w2(t)
)
dt+ σ2(y)dB(t), t ∈ [0, T ),
y(0) = y,
(3)
where σij and dij, i, j = 1, 2 are positive scalar coefficients.
For a mean-field game formulation, consider a probability density functionm : [xon, xoff ]×
[0, 1]× [t, T ]→ [0,+∞[, (x, y, t) 7→ m(x, y, t), which satisfies
∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
m(x, y, t)dxdy = 1
for every t. Let us also define as mon(t) :=
∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
ym(x, y, t)dxdy. Likewise we denote
by moff (t) = 1−mon(t).
At every time t the network or mains frequency depends linearly on the discrepancy
between the percentage of TCLs in on position and a nominal value. We call such a
discrepancy as error and denote it by e(t) = mon(t) − mon, where mon is the nominal
value (the higher the percentage of TCLs in on position with respect to the nominal
value, the lower the network frequency).
We then consider the running cost below, which depends on the distribution m(x, y, t)
through the error e(t):
c(x(t), y(t), u(t), m(x, y, t)) = 1
2
(
qx(t)2 + ronuon(t)
2 + roffuoff(t)
2
)
+y(t)(Se(t) +W ),
(4)
where q, ron, roff , and S are opportune positive scalars.
Note that cost (4) includes four terms. The term 1
2
qx(t)2 penalizes the deviation of the
TCLs’ temperature from the nominal value, which we set to zero. The terms 1
2
ronuon(t)
2
introduces a cost for fast switching; namely this cost is zero when either uon(t) = 0 (no
switching) and is maximal when uon(t) = 1 (probability 1 of switching). Similar comment
applies 1
2
roffuoff(t)
2. The term y(t)Se(t) accounts for the network stabilization in that
it penalizes those appliances that are on whenever e(t) > 0, the latter condition meaning
that demand exceeds supply. The same term turns into a revenue if an appliance is
on whenever e(t) < 0, i.e., whenever supply exceeds demand. Finally, the penalty term
y(t)W accounts for the minimization of power, namely, whenever the TCL is on the power
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consumption is W .
Also consider a terminal cost Ψ : R→ [0,+∞[, x 7→ Ψ(x) to be yet designed.
Problem statement. Given a finite horizon T > 0 and an initial distribution m0 :
[xon, xoff ] × [0, 1] → [0,+∞[, minimize over U and maximize over W , subject to the
controlled system (3), the cost functional
J(x, y, t, u(·)) = E
∫ T
0
(c(x(t), y(t), u(t), w(t), m(x, y, t))−
1
2
γ2‖w(t)‖2)dt+Ψ(X(T )),
where γ is a positive scalar, U andW are the sets of all measurable state feedback closed-
loop policies u(·) : [0,+∞[→ R respectively, and w(·) : [0,+∞[→ R and m(·) is the
time-dependent function describing the evolution of the mean of the distribution of the
TCLs’ states.
3 Preliminary results
This section reviews first- and second-order mean-field games in preparation to apply the
game to the problem at hand. In the first case, the microscopic dynamics is deterministic
and the resulting mean-field game involves only the first derivatives of the value function
and of the density function. In the second case, the microscopic dynamics is a stochastic
differential equation driven by a Brownian motion, which leads to the involvement of
second derivatives of the value function and density function. In addition to this, this
section specializes the model to the case under study, involving a population of TCLs and
introduced in the previous section.
3.1 First- and second-order mean-field games
This section streamlines some preliminary results on mean-field games. To this purpose,
consider a generic cost and dynamics
J(X, 0, U(.)) = infU(.)
∫ T
t=0
c(X(t), m, U(.))dt+Ψ(X(T )),
X˙(t) = F (X(t), U(.)) in Rn,
(5)
where c(.) is the running cost, Ψ(X) ∀ X ∈ in Rn is the terminal penalty, and where U(.)
is any state-feedback closed loop control policy. Let v(X, t) be the value function, i.e., the
optimal value of J(X, t, U(·)). Then from [20] it is well-known that the problem results
in the following mean-field game system
9


−∂tv(X, t)− F (X,U
∗(X))∂Xv(X, t)− c(X,m,U
∗(X)) = 0 (a)
in Rn×]0, T ],
v(X, T ) = Ψ(X) ∀ X ∈ in Rn,
U∗(X, t) = argmaxU∈R{−F (X,U)∂Xv(X, t)− c(X,m,U)}, (b)
(6)
{
∂tm(X, t) + div(F (X,U
∗(X))m(X, t)) = 0 in Rn×]0, T ],
m(X, 0) = m0(X), ∀ X ∈ in R
n.
(7)
The partial differential equation (PDE) 6 (a) is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
which returns the value function v(X, t) once we fix the distribution m(X, t); This PDE
has to be solved backwards with boundary conditions at final time T , represented by the
last line in 6 (a). In 6 (b) we have the optimal closed-loop control U∗(X, t) as maximizer of
the Hamiltonian function in the rhs. The PDE 7 represents the transport equation of the
measure m immersed in a vector field F (X,U∗(X)); It returns the distribution m(X, t)
once fixed the the optimal closed-loop control U∗(X, t) and consequently the vector field
F (X,U∗(X)). Such a PDE has to be solved forwards with boundary condition at the
initial time (see the last line) of (7).
In a second order mean-field game, the dynamics is a stochastic differential equation
driven by a Brownian motion, and the cost function is considered through its expected
value, namely,
J(X, 0, U(.)) = infU(.) E
∫ T
t=0
c(X(t), m, U(X(t)))dt+Ψ(X(T ))
dX(t) = F (X(t), U(.))dt+ σ(X)dB(t) in Rn,
(8)
where B(t) ∈ Rn is the Brownian motion and σ(X) ∈ Rn×n is the coefficient matrix.
From [20] the second-order mean-field game system is then given by


−∂tv(X, t)− F (X,U
∗(X))∂Xv(X, t)− c(X,m,U
∗(X))
−1
2
σ(X)σ(X)T : ∂XXv(X, t) = 0in R
n×]0, T ], (a)
v(X, T ) = Ψ(X) ∀ X ∈ in Rn,
U∗(X, t) = argmaxU∈R{−F (X,U)∂Xv(X, t)− c(X,m,U)}, (b)
(9)


∂tm(X, t) + div(F (X,U
∗(X))m(X, t))
−1
2
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 ∂
2
XiXj
(σ˜ijm(X, t)) = 0 in R
n×]0, T ],
m(X, 0) = m0(X), ∀ X ∈ in R
n,
(10)
10
where the symbol “:” denotes the Frobenius product and σ˜ij =
∑n
k=1 σik(X)σjk(X).
In a second-order mean-field game the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, as in 9 (a),
involves the second-order derivatives of the value function in the additional term repre-
sented by the Frobenius product; Likewise, also the transport equation as in (10) involves
the second-order derivatives of the density function. The rest of the system is similar
to the first-order case. Let us now specialize the above model to the TCLs application
introduced in the previous section.
3.2 Mean-field game for the TCL application
Specializing to our TCLs application, let v(x, y,m, t) be the value function, i.e., the opti-
mal value of J(x, y, t, u(·)). Let us denote by
k(x(t)) = x(t)(β − α) + (αxon − βxoff ).
Then, the problem at hand can be rewritten as in terms of the state, control and distur-
bance vectors
X(t) =
[
x(t)
y(t)
]
, u(t) =
[
uon(t)
uoff(t)
]
, w(t) =
[
w1(t)
w2(t)
]
and yields the linear quadratic problem:
inf
{ut}t
E
∫ T
0
[
1
2
(
‖X(t)‖2Q + ‖u(t)‖
2
R − γ
2‖w(t)‖2
)
+ LTX(t)
]
dt
dX(t) = (AX(t) +Bu(t) + C +Dw(t))dt+ ΣdB(t), in S
(11)
where
Q =
[
q 0
0 0
]
, R = r =
[
ron 0
0 roff
]
, L(e) =
[
0
Se(t) +W
]
,
A(x) =
[
−β k(x(t))
0 0
]
, B =
[
0 0
1 −1
]
, C =
[
βxoff
0
]
,
(12)
and
D =
[
d11 d12
d21 d22
]
, Σ =
[
σ11(x) 0
0 σ22(y)
]
. (13)
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The resulting mean-field game is given by


∂tVt(X) + infu supw
{
∂XVt(X)
T (AX +Bu+ C +Dw) + 1
2
(
‖X‖2Q
+‖u‖2R − γ
2‖w‖
)
+ LTX
}
+ 1
2
(σ11(x)
2∂xxv(X, t), (a)
+σ22(y)
2∂yyv(X, t)) = 0, in S × [0, T [,
v(X, T ) = g(x), in S
u∗(x, t) = argminu∈R
{
∂XVt(X)
T (AX +Bu+ C +Dw) +
1
2
‖u(t)‖2R
}
, (b)
w∗(x, t) = argmaxu∈R
{
∂XVt(X)
T (AX +Bu+ C +Dw)−
1
2
γ2‖w(t)‖2
}
(14)
and 

∂tm(x, y, t) + div[(AX +Bu+ C +Dw) m(x, y, t)]
−1
2
∑2
i=1
∑2
j=1 ∂
2
XiXj
(σ˜ijm(X, t)) = 0 in S×]0, T [,
m(xon, y, t) = m(xoff , y, t) = 0 ∀ y ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, T ],
m(x, y, 0) = m0(x, y) ∀ x ∈ [xon, xoff ], y ∈ [0, 1]∫ xoff
xon
m(x, t)dx = 1 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ],
(15)
where σ˜ij =
∑n
k=1 σik(X)σjk(X).
Essentially, the partial differential equation (PDE) (14) (a) is the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs equation which returns the value function v(x, y,m, t) once we fix the distribution
m(x, y, t); This PDE has to be solved backwards with boundary conditions at final time
T , represented by the last line in 14 (a). In 14 (b) we have the optimal closed-loop
control u∗(x, t) and worst-case disturbance w∗(x, t) as min-maximizers of the Hamiltonian
function in the RHS. The PDE (15) represents the transport equation of the measure m
immersed in a vector field AX +Bu+C+Dw; It returns the distribution m(x, y, t) once
fixed both u∗(x, t) and w∗(x, t) and consequently the vector field AX +Bu∗ + C +Dw∗.
Such a PDE has to be solved forwards with boundary condition at the initial time (see
the fourth line) of 15. Finally, once given m(x, y, t) from (c) and entered into the running
cost c(x, y,m, u) in (a), we obtain the error
{
mon(t) :=
∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
ym(x, y, t)dxdy ∀ t ∈ [0, T ],
e(t) = mon(t)−mon.
(16)
Note that
X¯(t) =
[
x¯(t)
y¯(t)
]
=
[
x¯(t)
mon
]
=
[ ∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
xm(x, y, t)dxdy∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
ym(x, y, t)dxdy
]
,
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and therefore, henceforth we can refer to as mean-field equilibrium solutions any pair
(v(X, t), X¯(t)) which is solution of (14)-(15).
4 Main results
This paper contributes in three directions with respect to the TCLs application introduced
earlier. First, it analyzes and computes the mean-field equilibrium for the deterministic
mean-field game and proves that under certain conditions the microscopic dynamics is
asymptotically stable. We repeat the analysis for the stochastic case, assuming that the
microscopic dynamics is uncertain. Even for this case, a mean-field equilibrium is com-
puted, and stochastic stability is studied. We distinguish two cases. On the one hand, we
consider a stochastic disturbance which fades to zero the closer the state is to zero. The
Brownian motion coefficients are linear in the state and the resulting dynamics is also
known as geometric Brownian motion. On the other hand, we take the stochastic distur-
bance being independent on the state. The Brownian motion coefficients are constant and
the resulting dynamics mirrors the Langevin equation. In both cases we prove stochastic
stability of second-moment for the stochastic process at hand. This section ends with a
detailed analysis of robustness properties. The microscopic dynamics is now subject to
an addition exogenous input, the disturbance, with bounded resource or energy. Even for
this case, we study the mean-field equilibrium and investigate on condition that guarantee
stability.
4.1 Mean-field equilibrium and stability
In this section we establish an explicit solution in terms of mean-field equilibrium for the
deterministic case and study stability of the microscopic dynamics. This case is obtained
by fixing to zero the coefficients of both stochastic and adversarial disturbance.
The linear quadratic problem we wish to solve is then:
inf
{ut}t
∫ T
0
[
1
2
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)T
)
+ LTX(t)
]
dt
X˙(t) = AX(t) +Bu(t) + C in S.
(17)
The next result shows that the problem reduces to solving three matrix equations.
Theorem 1 (Mean-field equilibrium) Let D,Σ = 0 in the game (14)-(15). A mean-
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field equilibrium for (14)-(15) is given by


v(X, t) = 1
2
XTP (t)X +Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
˙¯X(t) = [A(x)−BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)−BR−1BT Ψ¯(t) + C,
(18)
where 

P˙ + PA(x) + A(x)TP − PBR−1BTP +Q = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙ + A(x)TΨ+ PC − PBR−1BTΨ+ L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙ +ΨTC − 1
2
ΨTBR−1BTΨ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0,
(19)
and Ψ¯(t) =
∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
Ψ(t)m(x, y, t)dxdy. Furthermore, the mean-field equilibrium strate-
gies are given by
u∗(X, t) = −R−1BT [PX +Ψ]. (20)
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
Let us note that by substituting the mean-field equilibrium strategies u∗ = −R−1BT [PX+
Ψ] given in (20) in the open-loop microscopic dynamics X˙(t) = AX(t) + Bu(t) + C as
defined in (17), the closed-loop microscopic dynamics is
X˙(t) = [A(x)− BR−1BTP ]X(t)− BR−1BTΨ(x, e, t) + C. (21)
Now, let X be the set of equilibrium points for (21), namely, the set of X such that
X = {(X, e) ∈ R2 × R| [A(x)− BR−1BTP ]X(t)− BR−1BTΨ(x, e, t) + C = 0},
and let V (X(t)) = dist(X(t),X ). The next result establishes a condition under which the
above dynamics converges asymptotically to the set of equilibrium points.
Corollary 1 (Asymptotic stability) If it holds
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A− BR−1BTP ]X(t)−BR−1BTΨ∗(x(t), e(t)) + C
)
< −‖X(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
2
(22)
then dynamics (21) is asymptotically stable, namely, limt→∞ dist(X(t),X ) = 0.
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
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4.2 Stochastic case
In this section we study the case where the dynamics is given by a stochastic differential
equation driven by a Brownian motion. In other words, the model is uncertain and the
uncertainty is modeled as a stochastic disturbance.
The problem at hand is then:
inf
{ut}t
E
∫ T
0
[
1
2
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)T
)
+ LTX(t)
]
dt
dX(t) = (AX(t) +Bu(t) + C)dt+ ΣdBt,
(23)
where all matrices are as in (12) and
Σ =
[
σ11(x) 0
0 σ22(y)
]
. (24)
This section investigates on the solution of the HJI equation under the assumption that
the time evolution of the common state is given. We show that the problem reduces to
solving three matrix equations. To see this, by isolating the HJI part of (14) for fixed mt,
for t ∈ [0, T ], we have


−∂tv(X, t)− supu
{
− ∂Xv(X, t)
T (AX +Bu+ C)− 1
2
(
XTQX
−uTRu
)
− LTX
}
+ 1
2
(σ11(x)
2∂xxv(X, t)
+σ22(y)
2∂yyv(X, t)) = 0, in S × [0, T [,
v(X, T ) = g(x) in S,
u∗(x, t) = −r−1BT∂yv(X, t).
(25)
Let us consider the following value function
v(X, t) =
1
2
XTP (t)X +Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
and
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX +Ψ],
so that (48) can be rewritten as
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

1
2
XT P˙ (t)X + Ψ˙(t)X + χ˙(t) + (P (t)X +Ψ(t))T
[
−BR−1BT
]
(P (t)x+Ψ(t))
+(P (t)x+Ψ(t))T (AX + C) + 1
2
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)T
)
+LTX(t) + 1
2
(σ11(x)
2P11(t) + σ22(y)
2P22(t)) = 0 in S × [0, T [,
P (T ) = φ, Ψ(T ) = 0, χ(T ) = 0.
(26)
The boundary conditions are obtained by imposing that
v(X, T ) =
1
2
XTP (T )X +Ψ(T )X + χ(T ) =
1
2
XTφX.
4.2.1 Case I: state dependent variance
The first case we consider involves coefficients for the Brownian motion linear in the state,
namely
Σ(X) =
[
σˆ11x 0
0 σˆ22y
]
(27)
Theorem 2 (stochastic mean-field equilibrium: case I) A mean-field equilibrium
for the game (9) with Σ(X) as in (27) is given by


v(X, t) = 1
2
XTP (t)X +Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
˙¯X(t) = [A− BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)− BR−1BTΨ∗(X¯(t)) + C,
(28)
where

P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ ATP − PBR−1BTP +Q + P˜ = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) + ATΨ+ PC − PBR−1BTΨ+ L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC − 1
2
ΨTBR−1BTΨ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0,
(29)
and
P˜ = Diag((σˆ2iiPii)i=1,2) =
[
σˆ211P11 0
0 σˆ222P22
]
. (30)
Furthermore, the mean-field equilibrium strategy is
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX +Ψ] (31)
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Proof. Given in the appendix. 
Based on the above result, let us now substitute the expression of the mean-field equilib-
rium strategy u∗ = −R−1BT [PX +Ψ] as in (31) in the open-loop microscopic dynamics
dX(t) = (AX(t) + Bu(t) + C)dt + ΣdB(t) given in (23) so to obtain the closed-loop
microscopic dynamics
dX(t) =
[
(A(x)− BR−1BTP )X(t)−BR−1BTΨ∗(x(t), e(t)) + C
]
dt+ ΣdB(t) (32)
Now, let X be the set of equilibrium points for (32), namely, the set of X such that
X = {(X, e) ∈ R2 × R| (A(x)− BR−1BTP )X(t)−BR−1BTΨ∗(x, e) + C = 0},
and let V (X(t)) = dist(X(t),X ). The next result establishes a condition under which the
above dynamics converges asymptotically to the set of equilibrium points.
Corollary 2 (2nd moment boundedness) Let a compact set M⊂ R2 be given. Sup-
pose that for all X 6∈ M
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A− BR−1BTP ]X(t)−BR−1BTΨ∗(x(t), e(t)) + C
)
< −1
2
(σ211(x)∂xxV (X, t) + σ
2
22(x)∂yyV (X, t))
(33)
then dynamics (32) is a stochastic process with 2nd moment bounded.
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
4.2.2 Case II: state independent variance and Langevin equation
The second case we consider involves coefficients for the Brownian motion which are
constant, namely
Σ =
[
σˆ11 0
0 σˆ22
]
(34)
Theorem 3 (stochastic mean-field equilibrium: case II)
Let Σ be as in (34). A mean-field equilibrium for the game (14)-(15) is given by


v(X, t) = 1
2
XTP (t)X +Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
˙¯X(t) = [A−BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)−BR−1BTΨ∗(X¯(t)) + C
(35)
17
where 

P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ ATP − PBR−1BTP +Q = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) + ATΨ+ PC − PBR−1BTΨ+ L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC − 1
2
ΨTBR−1BTΨ+ P˜ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0,
(36)
and
P˜ =
[
σˆ211 0
0 σˆ222
]
. (37)
Furthermore, the mean-field equilibrium strategies are given by
u∗(X, t) = −R−1BT [PX +Ψ]. (38)
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
Based on the above result, let us now substitute the expression of the mean-field equilib-
rium strategy u∗ = −R−1BT [PX +Ψ] as in (38) in the open-loop microscopic dynamics
dX(t) = (AX(t) + Bu(t) + C)dt + ΣdB(t) given in (23) so to obtain the closed-loop
microscopic dynamics
dX(t) =
[
(A(x)− BR−1BTP )X(t)−BR−1BTΨ∗(x(t), e(t)) + C
]
dt+ ΣdB(t) (39)
Now, let X be the set of equilibrium points for (21), namely, the set of X such that
X = {(X, e) ∈ R2 × R| (A(x)− BR−1BTP )X(t)−BR−1BTΨ∗(x, e) + C = 0},
and let V (X(t)) = dist(X(t),X ). The next result establishes a condition under which the
above dynamics converges asymptotically to the set of equilibrium points.
Corollary 3 (2nd moment boundedness) Let a compact set M⊂ R2 be given. Sup-
pose that for all X 6∈ M
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A−BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ∗(x(t), e(t)) + C
)
< −1
2
(σˆ211∂xxV (X, t) + σˆ
2
22∂yyV (X, t))
(40)
then dynamics (39) is a stochastic process with 2nd moment bounded.
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
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4.3 Model miss-specification
This section deals with model miss-specification, this being represented by an additional
exogenous and adversarial disturbance. The disturbance is supposed to be of bounded
energy. Thus, the linear quadratic problem we wish to solve is:
inf
{ut}t
E
∫ T
0
[
1
2
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)− γ2w(t)Tw(t)
)
+ LTX(t)
]
dt
X˙(t) = AX(t) +Bu(t) + C +Dw(t) in S.
(41)
This section investigates on the solution of the HJI equation under the assumption that
the time evolution of the common state is given. We show that the problem reduces to
solving three matrix equations. To see this, by isolating the HJI part of (14) for fixed mt,
for t ∈ [0, T ], we have
Theorem 4 (worst-case mean-field equilibrium) A mean-field equilibrium for (14)-
(15) is given by


v(X, t) = 1
2
XTP (t)X +Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
˙¯X(t) = [A− BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)− BR−1BTΨ∗(X¯(t)) + C,
(42)
where


P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ ATP + P (−BR−1BT + 1
γ2
DDT )P +Q = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) + ATΨ+ PC + (−BR−1BT + 1
γ2
DDT )Ψ + L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC + 1
2
ΨT (−BR−1BT + 1
γ2
DDT )Ψ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0,
(43)
Furthermore, the mean-field equilibrium control and disturbance are
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX +Ψ]
w∗ = 1
γ2
DT [PX +Ψ].
(44)
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
Let us note that by substituting the mean-field equilibrium strategies u∗ = −R−1BT [PX+
Ψ] and w∗ = 1
γ2
DT [PX + Ψ] as given in (44) in the open-loop microscopic dynamics
X˙(t) = AX(t)+Bu(t)+C+Dw as defined in (41), the closed-loop microscopic dynamics
19
α β xon xon ron, roff q std(m0) m¯0
1 1 −10 10 10 1 1 0
Table 1: Simulation parameters
is
X˙(t) = [A(x)+ (−BR−1BT +
1
γ2
DDT )P ]X(t)+ (−BR−1BT +
1
γ2
DDT )Ψ∗(x(t), e(t))+C
(45)
Now, let X be the set of equilibrium points for (21), namely, the set of X such that
X = {(X, e) ∈ R2×R| [A(x)+(−BR−1BT+
1
γ2
DDT )P ]X(t)−BR−1BTΨ(x, e, t)+C = 0},
and let V (X(t)) = dist(X(t),X ). The next result establishes a condition under which the
above dynamics converges asymptotically to the set of equilibrium points.
Corollary 4 (worst-case stability) If it holds
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A+ (−BR−1BT + 1
γ2
DDT )P ]X(t) + (−BR−1BT + 1
γ2
DDT )
·Ψ∗(x(t), e(t)) + C
)
< −‖X(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
2
(46)
then dynamics (45) is asymptotically stable, namely, limt→∞ dist(X(t),X ) = 0.
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
5 Numerical studies
In this section a system consisting of n = 102 indistinguishable TCLs. All simulations are
carried out with MATLAB on an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo, CPU P8400 at 2.27 GHz and
a 3GB of RAM. The number of iterations is T = 30. We consider a discrete time version
of (17)
X(t+ dt) = X(t) + (A(x(t))X(t) +Bu(t) + C)dt. (47)
The parameter are as shown in Table 1 and in particular the step size dt = 0.1, the
cooling and heating rates are α = β = 1, the lowest and highest temperatures are xon =
−10, and xoff = 10, respectively, the penalty coefficients are ron = roff = 1, and q = 1,
and the initial distribution is normal with zero mean and standard deviation std(m(0)) =
1.
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Input: Set of parameters as in Table 1.
Output: TCLs’ states X(t)
1 : Initialize. Generate X(0) given m¯0 and std(m0)
2 : for time iter = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 do
3 : if iter > 0, then compute mt, m¯t, and std(mt)
4 : end if
5 : for player i = 1, . . . , n do
6 : Set t = iter · dt and compute control u˜(t) using current m¯(t)
7 : compute new state X(t+ dt) by executing (47)
8 : end for
9 : end for
10 : STOP
Table 2: Simulation algorithm
The numerical results are obtained using the algorithm in Table 2 for a discretized set
of states.
The optimal control is taken as
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX +Ψ]
where P is obtained from running the MATLAB command [P]=care(A,B,Q,R), which
receives the matrices as input and returns the solution P to the algebraic Riccati equation.
Under the assumption BR−1BTΨ ≈ C the resulting closed-loop dynamics is given by
X(t+ dt) = X(t) + [A− BR−1BTP ]X(t)dt.
Figure 4 displays the time plot of the state of each TCL, namely its temperature x(t)
(top row) and mode y(t) (bottom row). In contrast with what we observed in Fig. 2,
the TCLs show a stable behavior. The simulation is carried out assuming that any 10
seconds the states are subject to an impulse. The TCLs react to the impulse very fast
and converge to the equilibrium point before a new impulse is activated, as clear visually
in the plot.
We repeat the simulation for the two stochastic cases discussed earlier. The stochastic
version of the dynamics appears now as
X(t+ dt) = X(t) + (A(x(t))X(t) +Bu(t) + C + ΣW (t))dt
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Figure 4: Time plot of the state of each TCL, namely temperature x(t) (top row) and
mode y(t) (bottom row).
or for the first case, and
X(t+ dt) = X(t) + (A(x(t))X(t) +Bu(t) + C + Σ(x)W (t))dt
for the second case. HereW (t) is a random walk. The corresponding closed-loop dynamics
are then
X(t+ dt) = X(t) + [A− BR−1BTP ]X(t)dt+ ΣW (t)dt
and
X(t+ dt) = X(t) + [A−BR−1BTP ]X(t)dt+ Σ(x)W (t))dt
respectively. Figure 5 displays the time plot of the state of each TCL, namely its tem-
perature x(t) (top row) and mode y(t) (bottom row) in the first case. Even in this case,
differently from what observed sin Fig. 2, the TCLs react to the impulse and converge
to the equilibrium point before a new impulse is activated. The effects of the Brownian
22
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Figure 5: Time plot of the state of each TCL, namely temperature x(t) (top row) and
mode y(t) (bottom row).
motion is the one of enlarging the domain of attraction.
The experiment is repeated in Figure 6 for the geometric Brownian motion. As in
the previous cases the figure displays the time plot of the state of each TCL, namely its
temperature x(t) (top row) and mode y(t) (bottom row) in the first case. As the Brownian
motion is not weighted by the state (in modulus), its effects are attenuated and the plot
is more similar to the one in Fig. 4.
Note that except for the Langevin-type dynamics, in the remainder two cases the TCLs
states are driven to zero. For the Langevin-type dynamics the state is confined within a
neighborhood of zero.
6 Discussion
With regards to the problem at hand, the topic of dynamic response management has
sparked the attention of scientists from different disciplines. This is witnessed by the
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Figure 6: Time plot of the state of each TCL, namely temperature x(t) (top row) and
mode y(t) (bottom row).
rapid growing of publications in journals of different research areas, from differential game
theory [6, 12, 25], to control and optimization [4, 11, 22, 23, 26], to computer science [29].
One reason for this is that dynamic response management intersects research programs in
smart buildings and smart cities. The problem is relevant due to an ever-increasing size
of network systems and the consequent impossibility of centralizing the management of
the whole system.
Fully aware of the importance of the topic, let us discuss the relevance of the results
of this paper. First, it must be said that the game-theoretic approach presented here
is a natural way to deal with larges scale, complex and distributed systems where no
central planner may be capable of processing all information data and in order to control
the whole system online. One way to deal with this issue, and which is the main idea
of dynamic demand management, aims at assigning part of the regulation burden to
the consumers by using frequency responsive appliances. In other words, each appliance
regulates automatically and in a decentralized fashion its power demand based on the
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mains frequency.
In this respect, the provided model builds upon the strategic interaction among the elec-
trical appliances. Note that here we look at the problem in more general terms and talk
about electrical appliances rather than TCLs. The model suits the case where where the
latter are numerous and indistinguishable. Indistinguishable means that any appliance in
the same condition will react at the same way. We wish to highlight that indistinguisha-
bility is not a limitation, as in the case of heterogeneity of the electrical appliances, more
complex multi-population models may be derived based on the same modeling approach
used here.
The results provided in this paper shed light on the existence of mean-field equilibrium
solutions. By this we mean strategies based on the current and forecasted demand, which
are proven to attenuate oscillations of mains frequency. A first feature of the model at
hand is that the considered strategies are stochastic. This means that the TCL sets a
probability with which to switch on or off . Stochastic linear strategies are designed
as closed-loop feedback strategies on current state, temperature and switching mode.
Such strategies are computed over a finite horizon and therefore are based on forecasted
demand. From another angle, we may say that mean-field equilibrium strategies represent
the asymptotic limit of Nash equilibrium strategies, and as such they are the best-response
strategies of even single player, for fixed behavior of other players. The proven stability
of the microscopic dynamics confirms the asymptotic convergence of the TCLs’s states to
an equilibrium point, this being expressed in terms of temperature and switching mode.
The several cases studied in the paper have shown that this holds true in the cases of
both perfect and imperfect modeling. This is a clear evidence of a certain degree of
robustness characterizing the proposed strategies. In the case of imperfect modeling,
model mis-specifications is considered both in a stochastic and deterministic worst-case
scenario. Assuming imperfect models both with a stochastic or worst-case deterministic
disturbance acting on the state dynamics, conditions for convergence of the microscopic
dynamics are provided.
7 Concluding remarks
We have illustrated robust mean-field games as a paradigm for crowd-averse systems. We
have discussed these systems in the context of stock market, production engineering, and
dynamic demand management in power systems. As main contributions we first have
formulated the problem as a robust mean-field game; second, we have presented a new
approximation method based on the extension of the state space; third we have discussed
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a relaxation method to minimize the approximation error. Further results are obtained
for a scalar microscopic dynamics, for which we have established performance bounds,
and analyzed stochastic stability of both the microscopic and the macroscopic dynamics.
We can extend our study in at least three directions. These include i) the extension of
the approximation method to more general cost functionals, ii) the study of the case with
“local” mean-field interactions rather than “global” as in the current scenario, and iii) the
analysis of crowd-seeking scenarios in contrast to the crowd-averse cases analyzed in this
paper.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Let us start by isolating the HJI part of (14). For fixed mt and for t ∈ [0, T ], we have

−∂tv(x, y, t)−
{
y
[
− α(x− xon)
]
+ (1− y)
[
− β(x− xoff )
]}
∂xv(x, y, t)
+ supu∈R
{
−Bu ∂yv(x, y, t)−
1
2
qx2 + 1
2
uT ru+ y(Se+W )
}
= 0
in S×]0, T ],
v(x, y, T ) = Ψ(x) in S,
u∗(x, t) = −r−1BT∂yv(x, y, t)
(48)
which in a more compact form can be rewritten as


−∂tv(X, t)− supu
{
∂Xv(X, t)
T (AX +Bu+ C) + 1
2
(
XTQX
+uTRuT
)
+ LTX
}
= 0, in S × [0, T [,
v(X, T ) = g(x) in S,
u∗(x, t) = −r−1BT∂yv(X, t).
(49)
Let us consider the following value function
v(X, t) =
1
2
XTP (t)X +Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
and the corresponding optimal closed-loop state feedback strategy
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX +Ψ].
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Then (48) can be rewritten as


1
2
XT P˙ (t)X + Ψ˙(t)X + χ˙(t) + (P (t)X +Ψ(t))T
[
−BR−1BT
]
(P (t)x+Ψ(t))
+(P (t)x+Ψ(t))T (AX + C) + 1
2
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)T
)
+LTX(t) = 0 in S × [0, T [,
P (T ) = φ, Ψ(T ) = 0, χ(T ) = 0.
(50)
The boundary conditions are obtained by imposing that
v(x, T ) =
1
2
xTP (T )x+Ψ(T )x+ χ(T ) =
1
2
xTφx.
Since (50) is an identity in x, it reduces to three equations:


P˙ + PA(x) + A(x)TP − PBR−1BTP +Q = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙ + A(x)TΨ+ PC − PBR−1BTΨ + L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙+ΨTC − 1
2
ΨTBR−1BTΨ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0.
(51)
To understand the influence of the congestion term on the value function, let us now
develop the expression for Ψ and obtain
[
Ψ˙1
Ψ˙2
]
+
[
−β 0
k(x(t)) 0
][
Ψ1
Ψ2
]
+
[
P11 P12
P21 P22
][
βxoff
0
]
−
[
P12(r
−1
on + r
−1
off)Ψ2
P22(r
−1
on + r
−1
off)Ψ2
]
+
[
0
Se+W
]
.
(52)
The expression of Ψ then can be rewritten as


Ψ˙1 − βΨ1 + P11βxoff − P12(r
−1
on + r
−1
off )Ψ2 = 0,
Ψ˙2 + k(x(t))Ψ1 − P22(r
−1
on + r
−1
off )Ψ2 + (Se+W ) = 0,
(53)
which is of the form 

Ψ˙1 + aΨ1 + bΨ2 + c = 0,
Ψ˙2 + a
′Ψ1 + b
′Ψ2 + c
′ = 0.
(54)
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From the above set of inequalities, we obtain the solution Ψ(x(t), e(t), t). Note that the
term a′ depends on x and c′ depends on e(t).
Substituting the expression of the mean-field equilibrium strategies u∗ = −R−1BT [PX+
Ψ] as in (20) in the open-loop microscopic dynamics X˙(t) = AX(t) + Bu(t) + C intro-
duced in (17), and averaging both LHS and RHS we obtain the following closed-loop
macroscopic dynamics
˙¯X(t) = [A(x)− BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)− BR−1BT Ψ¯(t) + C,
where Ψ¯(t) =
∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
Ψ(x, e, t)m(x, y, t)dxdy and this concludes our proof.
Proof of Corollary 1
Let X(t) be a solution of dynamics (21) with initial value X(0) 6∈ X . Set t = {inf t >
0|X(t) ∈ X} ≤ ∞. For all t ∈ [0, t]
V (X(t+ dt))− V (X(t)) = ‖X(t+ dt)−ΠX (X(t))‖ − ‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
= ‖X(t) + dX(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖ − ‖X(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
= 1
‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t) + dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
2
− 1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
2.
(55)
Taking the limit of the difference above we obtain
V˙ (X(t)) = limdt→0
V (X(t+dt))−V (X(t))
dt
= limdt→0
1
dt
[
1
‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t) + dX(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
2
− 1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
2
]
≤ 1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
[
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A−BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ∗(x(t), e(t)) + C
)
+ ‖X(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
2
]
< 0,
(56)
which implies LV (X(t)) < 0, for all X(t) 6∈ X and this concludes our proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
This proof follows the same reasoning as the proof of Theorem 1. However, differently
from there, here for the quadratic terms in (26) we have
σ11(x)
2P11(t) + σ22(y)
2P22(t) = σˆ
2
11x
2P11(t) + σˆ
2
22y
2P22(t).
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Reviewing (26) as an identity in x, this leads to the following three equations to solve in
the variable P (t), Ψ(t), and χ(t):


P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ ATP − PBR−1BTP +Q + P˜ = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) + ATΨ+ PC − PBR−1BTΨ+ L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC − 1
2
ΨTBR−1BTΨ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0,
(57)
where
P˜ = Diag((σˆ2iiPii)i=1,2) =
[
σˆ211P11 0
0 σˆ222P22
]
. (58)
Proof of Corollary 2
Let X(t) be a solution of dynamics (32) with initial value X(0) 6∈ X . Set t = {inf t >
0|X(t) ∈ X} ≤ ∞ and let V (X(t)) = dist(X(t),X ). For all t ∈ [0, t]
V (X(t+ dt))− V (X(t)) = ‖X(t+ dt)−ΠX (X(t))‖ − ‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
= ‖X(t) + dX(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖ − ‖X(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
= 1
‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t) + dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
2−
1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
2.
(59)
From the definition of infinitesimal generator
LV (X(t)) = limdt→0
EV (X(t+dt))−V (X(t))
dt
= limdt→0
1
dt
[
E
(
1
‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t) + dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
2
)
− 1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
2
]
≤ 1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
[
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A− BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ∗(x(t), e(t)) + C
)
+1
2
(σ211(x)∂xxV (X, t) + σ
2
22(y)∂yyV (X, t))
]
.
(60)
From (33) the above implies that LV (X(t)) < 0, for all X(t) 6∈ M and this concludes
our proof.
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Proof of Theorem 3
From (34), in the HJB equation (26) we now have constant terms
1
2
2∑
i=1
σii(.)
2Pii(t) = σˆ
2
11P11(t) + σˆ
2
22P22(t).
Again, since the HJB equation (26) is an identity in x, it reduces to three equations:


P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ ATP − PBR−1BTP +Q = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) + ATΨ+ PC − PBR−1BTΨ + L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC − 1
2
ΨTBR−1BTΨ+ P˜ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0,
(61)
where
P˜ =
[
σˆ211 0
0 σˆ222
]
. (62)
Substituting the expression of the mean-field equilibrium strategy u∗ = −R−1BT [PX+
Ψ] as in (38) in the open-loop microscopic dynamics dX(t) = (AX(t)+Bu(t)+C)dt+ΣdBt
given in (23) and averaging both LHS and RHS we obtain the following closed-loop
macroscopic dynamics
˙¯X(t) = [A−BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)−BR−1BTΨ∗(X¯(t)) + C,
and this concludes our proof.
7.1 Proof of Corollary 3
Let X(t) be a solution of dynamics (39) with initial value X(0) 6∈ X . Set t = {inf t >
0|X(t) ∈ X} ≤ ∞ and let V (X(t)) = dist(X(t),X ). For all t ∈ [0, t]
V (X(t+ dt))− V (X(t)) = ‖X(t+ dt)−ΠX (X(t))‖ − ‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
= ‖X(t) + dX(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖ − ‖X(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
= 1
‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t) + dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
2−
1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
2
(63)
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From the definition of infinitesimal generator
LV (X(t)) = limdt→0
EV (X(t+dt))−V (X(t))
dt
= limdt→0
1
dt
[
E
(
1
‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t) + dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
2
)
− 1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
2
]
≤ 1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
[
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A− BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ∗(x(t), e(t)) + C
)
+1
2
(σˆ211∂xxV (X, t) + σˆ
2
22∂yyV (X, t))
]
.
(64)
From (40) the above implies that LV (X(t)) < 0, for all X(t) 6∈ M and this concludes
our proof.
Proof of Theorem 4
Isolating the HJI equation in (14), we have


−∂tVt(X)− supu infw
{
∂XVt(X)
T (AX +Bu+ C +Dw) + 1
2
(
X(t)TQX(t)
+u(t)TRu(t)− γ2w(t)Tw(t)
)
+ LTX(t)
}
= 0, in S × [0, T [,
VT (X) = g(x) in S.
(65)
Let us consider the following value function
v(X, t) =
1
2
XTP (t)X +Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
and the corresponding mean-field equilibrium control and worst-case disturbance
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX +Ψ],
w∗ = 1
γ2
DT [PX +Ψ].
(66)
so that (65) can be rewritten as
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

1
2
XT P˙ (t)X + Ψ˙(t)X + χ˙(t) + (P (t)X +Ψ(t))T
[
− BR−1BT + 1
γ2
DDT
]
(P (t)x+Ψ(t))
+(P (t)x+Ψ(t))T (AX + C) + 1
2
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)− γ2w(t)Tw(t)
)
+LTX(t) + 1
2
∑2
i=1 σii(.)
2Pii(t) = 0 in R
2 × [0, T [,
P (T ) = φ, Ψ(T ) = 0, χ(T ) = 0.
(67)
The boundary conditions are obtained by imposing that
v(X, T ) =
1
2
XTP (T )X +Ψ(T )X + χ(T ) =
1
2
XTφX.
The above set of identities in x yields the following three equations in the variable P (t),
Ψ(t), and χ(t):


P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ ATP + P (−BR−1BT + 1
γ2
DDT )P +Q = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) + ATΨ+ PC + (−BR−1BT + 1
γ2
DDT )Ψ + L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC + 1
2
ΨT (−BR−1BT + 1
γ2
DDT )Ψ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0.
(68)
Substituting the expressions of the mean-field equilibrium strategies u∗ = −R−1BT [PX+
Ψ] and w∗ = 1
γ2
DT [PX + Ψ] as in (44) in the open-loop microscopic dynamics X˙(t) =
AX(t) +Bu(t) + C introduced in (41), and averaging both LHS and RHS we obtain the
following closed-loop macroscopic dynamics
˙¯X(t) = [A+ (−BR−1BT +
1
γ2
DDT )P ]X¯(t) + (−BR−1BT +
1
γ2
DDT )Ψ∗(X¯(t)) + C,
and this concludes our proof.
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Proof of Corollary 4
Let X(t) be a solution of dynamics (45) with initial value X(0) 6= X . Set t = {inf t >
0|X(t) ∈ X} ≤ ∞ and let V (X(t)) = dist(X(t),X ). For all t ∈ [0, t]
V (X(t+ dt))− V (X(t)) = ‖X(t+ dt)−ΠX (X(t))‖ − ‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
= ‖X(t) + dX(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖ − ‖X(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
= 1
‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t) + dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
2
− 1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
2.
(69)
From the definition of infinitesimal generator
V˙ (X(t)) = limdt→0
V (X(t+dt))−V (X(t))
dt
= limdt→0
1
dt
[
1
‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t) + dX(t)− ΠX (X(t))‖
2
≤ 1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
[
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A+ (−BR−1BT + 1
γ2
DDT )P ]X(t)
+(−BR−1BT + 1
γ2
DDT )Ψ∗(x(t), e(t)) + C
)
≤ 0
(70)
which implies LV (ρ(t)) < 0, for all X(t) 6= X and this concludes our proof.
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